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Abstract
We offer a model of currency carry trades in which carry traders
generate self-sustained excess returns if they coordinate on supplying
excessive capital to a target economy. The interest-rate differential
between their funding currency and the target currency is their co-
ordination device. Such self-fulfilling profitable currency trades arise
when the central bank of the target economy ignores the impact of
carry-trade inflows on domestic asset prices, and responds only to their
effect on inflation. We solve for a unique equilibrium that exhibits the
classic pattern of the carry-trade recipient currency appreciating for
extended periods, punctuated by sharp falls.
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1 Introduction
A currency carry trade consists in selling a low interest rate currency to
fund the purchase of a high interest rate currency. The high Sharpe ratio
generated by carry-trade strategies is one of the most enduring puzzles in
international finance.
The international capital flows that chase such large interest-rate dif-
ferentials are regularly at the forefront of the debate on global financial
stability. They are often accused of unduly destabilizing local financial
markets. Several observers have recently pointed at an important global
component in local asset prices and bank leverage that is highly correlated
with funding conditions in U.S. dollars. This component seems associated
with international credit flows that may be misaligned with local macroeco-
nomic conditions, and with the objectives of the local monetary authority
(Agrippino and Rey, 2014; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Rey, 2013).
This paper offers a theory that relates excess returns on carry trades
to the destabilizing consequences of their associated capital flows. We write
down a model in which carry traders may earn positive excess returns (rents)
if they successfully coordinate on exploiting asynchronous monetary policies.
In our setup, international investors enter into carry trades by trading bonds
denominated in the world currency and in the currency of a small open econ-
omy. Our results rest on three ingredients. First, markets are incomplete
in that the households of this small economy, unlike carry traders, can only
trade domestic bonds.
Second, the prices of the nontradable goods in this small economy are
much stickier than that of the tradable goods. This is consistent with evi-
dence documented by Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005).1
Finally, the domestic monetary authority anchors domestic inflation ex-
pectations by committing to a textbook interest rule that responds to re-
alized CPI inflation. In particular, the monetary authority responds to
carry-trade inflows only insofar as they affect domestic inflation. It ignores
the direct effect of these inflows on local asset prices.
The mechanism that leads to possible excess returns on carry trades is
as follows. First, market incompleteness implies that the inflows/outflows
in the domestic bond market resulting from carry-trade activity affect bond
prices. Second, by ignoring that carry-trade inflows bid up asset prices and
thus reduce the domestic real rate, the central bank acts as if it was inadver-
1They argue that the slow adjustment of the prices of nontradables explains why the
large devaluations that they study are associated with little inflation, and with a large
decline in the real exchange rate.
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tently introducing positive policy shocks to the interest rule in response to
these inflows. This implies that carry-trade inflows result in a realized infla-
tion that is below target. Third, since the prices of nontradable goods do not
adjust much, this deflationary impact of carry-trade inflows must operate
through the prices of tradable goods, and thus through a large appreciation
of the nominal exchange rate.
If these three effects are sufficiently important, then the carry trade
generates self-justified abnormal profits, and the anticipation of future large
capital inflows in (or outflows out of) the small open economy is self-fulfilling.
We illustrate this novel mechanism in two different settings. Section 2
first offers a perfect-foresight model in which these ingredients interplay in
the simplest and most transparent fashion. We show that they can generate
(at least) three steady-states. In one steady-state, carry traders’ portfolio
choice has an interior solution, uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds and
there are no excess returns on the carry trade. If this steady-state is unsta-
ble, there are also steady-states in which the carry trade is a self-fulfilling ar-
bitrage opportunity—a free lunch that arises if and only if carry traders seek
to exploit it. In one of these steady-states, carry traders supply excessive
capital to the domestic economy and benefit from a perpetual appreciation
of the exchange rate, whereas in the other one they short domestic bonds
too much and benefit from the domestic currency depreciating.
Section 3 then develops a more sophisticated version of the model in
which the interest rate on the world currency is subject to exogenous stochas-
tic shocks that we interpret as policy shocks. In this case, the equilibrium is
unique and the interest-rate differential acts as a coordination device among
carry traders. Positive shocks on the interest-rate differential set off dy-
namics in which capital inflows increase, and the domestic currency keeps
appreciating. This generates a prolonged series of positive returns on the
carry trade, that ends abruptly only after a sufficiently long series of nega-
tive shocks on the interest differential leads carry traders to coordinate on
large and rapid capital outflows. Importantly, the carry trade is no longer
an arbitrage opportunity in this model but only a “good deal”—a financial
transaction that has a positive net present value.
This latter model with unique equilibrium yields several interesting pre-
dictions. First, it suggests that a sufficiently large interest-rate differential
predicts an appreciation of the high-rate currency. Second, it also predicts
the profitability of FX momentum strategies—carry trades that were prof-
itable in the previous period are more likely to be profitable in the current
one. Further, since equilibrium paths feature rare but dramatic fluctuations
in carry-trade activity, finite sample paths generated by the model would
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likely generate a peso problem, and lead to an overestimation of the expected
return on the carry trade. Finally, our model also generates a new set of
yet untested predictions on the relationship between the stance of monetary
policy and the patterns of carry-trade returns.
Related Literature
Note first that our theory of carry-trade returns as self-fulfilling genuine
excess returns bears little relationship to the existing theories that seek to
explain the return on carry trades as a compensation for (possibly mismea-
sured) risk. Farhi and Gabaix (2014) thorougly survey this existing litera-
ture. We do not deny that a significant fraction of carry-trade returns may
reflect risk premia. We abstract from risk considerations here for tractability
only, and view our theory as a complement to such risk-based considerations
rather than a competing alternative.
More generally, Engel (2015) provides a comprehensive recent survey
of the vast literature on exchange rate determination and on the failure of
UIP. Here we focus on detailing the relationship of our paper to a small
number of closely related contributions both within and outside the field of
international economics.
Our approach is most closely related to models of financial instability in
which speculators earn rents if they successfully coordinate on a collective
course of action that triggers a policy response that benefits them. In inter-
national economics, static models of self-fulfilling currency attacks pioneered
by Obstfeld (1996) have this flavor. Farhi and Tirole (2012) or Schneider and
Tornell (2004) offer models of “collective moral hazard” in which the gov-
ernment bails out speculators if their aggregate losses are sufficiently large,
which creates a coordination motive among speculators. In this paper, we
invoke related arguments in order to rationalize carry-trades returns. We
contribute to this literature on coordination-driven financial instability in
two ways.
First, our paper is the first, to our knowledge, in which speculators seek
to game an interest-rate rule that is directly borrowed from New-Keynesian
textbooks. This is a useful and novel attempt at bridging the gap between
the literature on destabilizing speculation and mainstream monetary eco-
nomics.
Second, we formalize the dynamic coordination game among carry traders
using the tools developed by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel,
and Pauzner (2001) in order to obtain a unique predictable outcome. We
show that their setup can be adapted to the situation in which strategic
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complementaries among agents coexist with congestion effects. This is im-
portant because most financial models with strategic complementarities also
feature congestion effects. We also show that the equilibrium paths result-
ing from this model square well, at least qualitatively, with many empirical
patterns of carry-trade returns. He and Xiong (2012) also apply the equi-
librium selection techniques developed by Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner in
a financial context—the roll-over of short-term debt.
Finally, it is interesting to relate our approach to the literature on port-
folio demand in incomplete markets. In a recent contribution, Gabaix and
Maggiori (2015) introduce carry traders as financial institutions that benefit
from the incompleteness of global financial markets by intermediating gains
from trade between countries. Financial constraints imply that these insti-
tutions supply liquidity inelastically, which generates risk premia on carry
trades. We also model carry traders as financial institutions operating in
incomplete markets. In our setup, however, these institutions source funds
in one country in order to destabilize another country that uses an inappro-
priate monetary policy. Thus we reach very different conclusions regarding
the relationship between limits to arbitrage and excess returns. First, in
our setup, excess returns are self-fulfilling. They may or may not be there
depending on the equilibrium trading strategies on which the arbitrageurs
coordinate. Second, whereas tighter financial constraints lead to larger ex-
cess returns in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), the opposite holds in our setup.
Less constrained arbitrageurs have more financial muscle to exploit the pol-
icy mistakes of central banks. Thus they have a free hand at reaping higher
excess returns, and they generate more financial instability by doing so.
2 Inflation targeting and self-justified arbitrages
Time is discrete and is indexed by t ∈ Z. There are two types of agents,
households populating a small open economy and “carry traders.” There is
a single tradable good that has a fixed unit price in the world currency.
Households
The households live in a small open economy. They use a domestic currency
that trades at St units of the world currency per unit at date t.
At each date, a unit mass of households are born. Households live for two
dates, consume when young and old, and work when old. Each household
receives an initial endowment at birth with nominal value PtW ≥ 0, where
5
Pt is the domestic price level.
2 The cohort that is born at date t has quasi-
linear preferences over bundles of consumption and labor (Ct, Ct+1, Nt+1)
lnCt +
Ct+1 −N1+ηt+1
R
, (1)
where η,R > 0.
Domestic consumption services Ct are produced combining the tradable
good CTt and two nontradable goods C
N1
t and C
N2
t according to the tech-
nology
Ct =
(
CTt
)α (
CN1t
)β (
CN2t
)γ
ααββγγ
, (2)
where α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1) and α+ β + γ = 1. Domestic firms set by old house-
holds use labor input to produce. The exact specification of the production
processes are immaterial for our analysis. All that is needed is that both
nontradable goods are produced in finite, non zero quantities at each date.
Households collect labor income and the profits from their firms when old.
Households can trade risk-free one-period bonds in zero net supply that
are denominated in the domestic currency. The nominal interest rate on
these bonds is set by the domestic central bank according to a rule described
below.
Carry traders
Carry traders consume outside the domestic economy. They can trade the
same nominal bonds as that available to households. In addition, they
also have access to investments denominated in the world currency. These
investments generate an exogenous gross per period return that we denote
RW > 0.
In this section we are only interested in studying the circumstances un-
der which these carry traders can generate arbitrage opportunities between
two dates by forming zero-cost portfolios—portfolios such that the long and
short initial positions have the same initial value. We deem such portfo-
lios “carry trades.” Arbitrage opportunities are free lunches that any agent
with increasing utility over consumption demands in infinite quantity. Ac-
cordingly, we do not need to specify carry traders’ preferences. We only
assume that their utility is weakly increasing in the consumption of the
2If the endowment of young households is zero, then the carry traders introduced below
cannot have an aggregate short position in domestic bonds. A strictly positive endowment
plays no other role than allowing such short positions.
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tradable good.3 On the other hand, we need to impose limits on the size
of their portfolios so that their positions remain finite in the presence of
such arbitrage opportunities.4 We assume that the position of each carry
trader in domestic bonds must lie within [PtL
−, PtL+], where these limits
are denominated in the domestic currency and
L− > −W,
which ensures that households always consume positively.5
We now introduce in turn the two key ingredients of the model. First,
the domestic central bank responds to carry trades inflows only to the extent
that they affect the domestic CPI. Second, the prices of the non tradable
goods are more rigid than that of the tradable good in the domestic currency.
Monetary policy
We suppose that the domestic monetary authority sets the nominal interest
rate between t and t+ 1, It+1, following the interest-rate feedback rule:
It+1 = R
(
Pt
Pt−1
)1+Φ
(3)
where
Φ > 0. (4)
Rule (3) is a textbook interest-rate rule that follows the Taylor principle
from (4). Note that we assume an inflation target equal to zero and a target
real rate equal to the households’ discount rate R only to save on notations,
and without loss of generality. The important property of rule (3) is that
these targets are constant: The central bank responds to carry-trades inflows
only insofar as they affect domestic inflation. It does not respond directly
to the bond price fluctuations induced by these inflows.
3Whether they also derive utility from consuming other goods, and the curvature of
their utility function are immaterial.
4As is well-known, these trading limits could result, for example, from the carry traders’
ability to divert cash flows at some cost.
5Setting lending limits in real terms simplifies the exposition but is not crucial. Nominal
rigidities in trading limits would actually amplify our results.
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Nominal rigidities
The other important ingredient of the model is that the prices of the non-
tradable goods are less flexible than that of the tradable good. We introduce
rigidity in the pricing of nontradable goods in the straightforward following
way. First, we suppose that the law of one price holds for the tradable good
(“PPP at the docks”). Second, we suppose that the first nontradable good
N1 has a fully flexible price. A linear technology enables the transformation
of each date-t unit of N1 into F units of the tradable good, where F > 0.
Conversely, the second nontradable good N2 has a fully rigid price that
we normalize to 1 without loss of generality. Denoting P Tt , P
N1
t , and P
N2
t
the respective prices of these three goods, these assumptions readily imply:
P Tt St = 1, (5)
PN1t = FP
T
t , (6)
PN2t = 1. (7)
Relation (5) states that agents must be indifferent between purchasing the
tradable good using the world or the domestic currency. Relation (6) states
that domestic agents must be indifferent between purchasing the tradable
good or producing it out of N1, and relation (7) accounts for the rigidity of
N2’s price.
The introduction of the nontradable good with flexible price N1 is only
meant to decouple the “openness” of the economy as measured by 1− β −
γ and the flexibility of prices as measured by 1 − γ, where β and γ are
defined in (2). Only the parameter γ matters, however, for the remainder
of the analysis. Note that the case γ = 0 corresponds to the fully flexible
benchmark.
Perfect-foresight steady-states
We are now equipped to solve for the perfect-foresight steady-states of this
economy. We denote Lt the real aggregate borrowing by young households
from carry traders at date t, possibly negative. An equilibrium must be such
that the domestic economy is in equilibrium and carry traders form optimal
portfolios at each date.
Optimal carry trades
Let
Θt+1 =
St+1It+1
RWSt
. (8)
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That carry traders form optimal portfolios implies:
Lt

= L+ if Θt+1 > 1,
= L− if Θt+1 < 1,
∈ (L−, L+) if Θt+1 = 1.
(9)
Equilibrium in the domestic economy
The equilibrium in the domestic economy is characterized by (3), (5), (6),
(7), the households’ Euler equation,
It+1 =
RPt+1
(Lt +W )Pt
, (10)
and their optimal spending across goods at each date, which implies:
Pt = (P
T
t )
α(PN1t )
β(PN2t )
γ (11)
=
(
P Tt
)1−γ
F β, (12)
where (12) stems from injecting (6) and (7) in (11).
These equilibrium conditions form a simple log-linear system. We intro-
duce
r = lnR,
δ = ln
(
R
RW
)
,
θt = ln Θt,
it = ln It,
st = lnSt,
lt = ln(Lt +W ),
pit+1 = ln
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
.
As is standard, the Euler equation (10) and the interest-rate rule (3) define
a linear-difference system for the path of inflation:
it+1 = r − lt + pit+1 (13)
it+1 = r + Φpit (14)
that has a unique non-exploding solution:
pit = −
∑
k≥0
lt+k
(1 + Φ)k+1
. (15)
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Relation (15) captures the first important ingredient of the model. Cur-
rent inflation reflects all the future expected “shocks” (lt+k)k≥0 caused by
carry trades on the real rate. A generic feature of New-Keynesian models is
that inflation reflects anticipated future “policy shocks”(see e.g. Cochrane,
2011). The novelty here is that these shocks are not exogenous policy shocks.
They are instead the equilibrium outcome of carry traders’ optimal portfolio
choice.
Using (12) and (5), one has
st+1 − st = − 1
1− γ pit+1. (16)
Relation (16) reflects the second important ingredient of the model—the
rigidity of nontradables’ prices implies that the nominal exchange rate is
very sensitive to inflation expectations.
Plugging (16) and (10) in (8) yields
θt+1 = st+1 − st + it+1 − lnRW ,
= − 1
1− γ pit+1 + pit+1 − lt + δ, (17)
=
γ
1− γ
∑
k≥0
lt+k+1
(1 + Φ)k+1
− lt + δ. (18)
We now determine the steady-states in which the debt level l is constant
over time. We introduce
l ≡ ln(W + L−), (19)
l ≡ ln(W + L+). (20)
We have:
Proposition 1. Suppose there exists l∗ ∈ (l, l) such that
γ − Φ (1− γ)
(1− γ) Φ l
∗ + δ = 0. (21)
Then l = l∗ is a steady-state in which uncovered interest parity (UIP)
holds and the carry trade earns no excess return (θ = 0).
If Φ(1 − γ) > γ, this is the only steady-state. If RW = R, then l∗ = 0,
and the nominal exchange rate and the domestic price level are constant in
this steady-state.
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If Φ(1 − γ) < γ, there also exists a steady-state with maximum inflows
(l = l) in which the excess return on the carry trade is positive. There
also exists a steady-state with maximum outflows (l = l), and a negative
excess return on the carry trade. If RW = R, then the nominal exchange
rate perpetually appreciates in the former steady-state and depreciates in the
latter.
Proof. For l fixed, expression (18) becomes
θ =
γ − Φ (1− γ)
(1− γ) Φ l + δ.
Condition (21) implies that there exists a unique steady-state such that
θ = 0. It is the only steady-state if Φ(1 − γ) > γ, whereas l = l and l = l
can be sustained otherwise.
The situation Φ(1 − γ) < γ in which there are multiple steady-states
may be interpreted as one that is prone to destabilizing speculation. In this
situation, the stable steady-state in which UIP holds and there is no free
lunch is unstable. Because current and future capital inflows reinforce each
other, there is also the possibility that carry traders create and exploit a
self-justified arbitrage opportunity. Note that the no-arbitrage/UIP steady-
state is unique regardless of the monetary rule when prices are fully flexible
(γ = 0).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is best seen from the return on carry
trade as given in equation (17). This expression decomposes the impact of
current lending lt and that of future lending (lt+k)k≥1 on the current ex-
cess return on carry trade θt+1. Current lending has a negative impact on
the current return on carry trade simply because it makes bonds expensive
(term −lt in (17)). In contrast, the return on carry trade increases in future
lending for the following reason. First, future anticipated carry trades are
deflationary, and this reduces the nominal domestic interest rate and thus
the profitability of the current carry trade (term pit+1 decreasing in future
lending). This is more than offset, however, by the impact of future lend-
ing on nominal exchange rate appreciation (term −pit+11−γ increasing in future
lending). Future lending leads to a current nominal exchange rate apprecia-
tion that is larger than the reduction in the CPI because of the assumption
that nontradables’ prices are less flexible than that of the tradable good.
In sum, there are multiple steady-states when lending by other carry
traders makes lending more appealing to each carry trader. Market incompleteness—
households have no access to foreign investments—combined with a mone-
tary rule that is not too aggressive leads to self-justified arbitrage opportu-
nities. This result is novel, to the best of our knowledge. The goal of this
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perfect-foresight model is to present it in the simplest and most transparent
fashion. This setup has two important limitations, however:
1. If carry traders hold the same position forever, then the central bank
should end up adjusting its real-rate target and the producers of non-
tradable goods should end up adjusting their prices.
2. In this environment, the interest-rate differential plays no role in set-
ting off steady-states with extreme capital inflows or outflows. Thus
the model has no prediction regarding the correlation between the in-
terest rate on a currency and its appreciation, nor on returns on the
carry trade.
The next section develops a model that addresses these issues. We write
down a version of the model in which carry traders switch from maximum
to minimum positions at points that are uniquely determined by the paths
of a stochastic interest-rate differential. This addresses the first limitation
because the assumption of passive monetary policy and price setting is more
natural when the carry trade size oscillates around a long-term average.
This may stem for example from adjustment costs or noisy data. Regarding
the second limitation, that the interest-rate differential is the coordination
device among carry traders in a unique equilibrium will imply that this
differential predicts the expected return on carry trades.
3 Destabilizing carry trades
We now assume that time is continuous. The fixed integer dates of the
previous section are replaced by the arrival times of a Poisson process with
intensity 1. Namely, at each arrival time Tn, a new cohort of households are
born, and die at the next arrival time Tn+1. They value consumption and
labor only at these two dates, with preferences that are the same as that in
the previous section:
lnCTn +
1
R
ETn
[
CTn+1 −N1+ηTn+1
]
.
At each arrival date Tn, the central bank sets a nominal rate ITn+1 between
Tn and Tn+1 according to the rule:
ITn+1 = R
(
PTn
PTn−1
)1+Φ
. (22)
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Replacing integer dates with dates that arrive at a constant rate is not
essential, and only for tractability. It will entail that the carry traders’
problem studied below is time homogeneous.
In Section 2, carry trades were (possibly) textbook arbitrage opportuni-
ties. Thus we only needed to assume that carry traders had increasing utility
without further detailing their preferences. In this section, carry trades will
be profitable on average, but will have negative payoffs with a non-zero prob-
ability. They will be mere “good deals” rather than arbitrage opportunities.
Thus we now need to be more explicit about carry traders’ preferences in
order to characterize their trading behavior. We follow Gabaix and Maggiori
(2015) and model carry traders as financial institutions as follows.
Carry traders
Carry traders are a unit-mass continuum of financial institutions that can
form zero-cost portfolios in bonds denominated in either currency at each
date Tn with size within [PTnL
−, PTnL+] (in units of the domestic currency).
The date-Tn trade is unwound at the next date Tn+1 and the realized profit
or loss is paid to the old households at this date. Each firm maximizes the ex-
pected value of future consumption paid to all future households discounted
at the households’ rate R.6
The two following modifications to the model in Section 2 are key to
generate equilibrium uniqueness.
First, we assume that the interest rate at which carry traders borrow in
the world currency between two arrival dates Tn and Tn+1 is given by
RWTn+1 = R (1− wTn) , (23)
where wt is a Wiener process with no drift and volatility σ
2. In other
words, we introduce an exogenous stochastic component in the interest rate
differential.
Second, we assume that the capital supplied by carry traders is slow-
moving in the following sense. Each carry trader can revise its trading
strategy only at switching dates that are generated by a Poisson process with
intensity λ. These switching dates are independent across carry traders. In
between two switching dates, each carry trader commits to a trading strategy
and thus to lending a fixed real amount Lt ∈ [L−, L+] to each new cohort
of households at each arrival date Tn (if any).
6In particular carry traders’ objective increases in the consumption of the tradable
good as was assumed in Section 2.
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This model of slow-moving capital has a key property that will yield
equilibrium uniqueness: Every carry trader knows that some other carry
traders will revise their trading strategy almost surely between his current
switching date and the next one.
Remark. It is important to stress that the exogenous trading limits
[PTnL
−, PTnL+] fulfill a very different role from that played in Section 2.
In the previous section, it was necessary to impose such limits regardless of
carry traders’ preferences because carry trades were (possibly) textbook ar-
bitrage opportunities. In this section, carry-trade portfolios generate losses
with a non-zero probability because of the stochastic world interest rate.
Thus, any risk-averse agent would demand them in finite quantities. Trad-
ing limits here only play the role of a very tractable substitute for risk
aversion that is commonplace in models in which agents’ attitude towards
risk is not the main focus.7
Local risk-neutrality implies that carry-traders choose corner portfolios.
We deem “active” a carry trader who committed to maximum lending L+ at
his last switching date, and “inactive” one who committed to the minimum
lending L−. Suppose that a carry trader has a chance to revise his position
at a date t such that
Tn−1 < t < Tn. (24)
Denoting Tλ his next switching date, its expected unit return from the carry
trade—the expected value from committing to lend one additional real unit
to each future cohort until Tλ—is
Θt = Et
∑
m≥0
1{Tλ>Tn+m}
Rm
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
STn+mR
− 1 + wTn+m
) .
(25)
Expression (25) states that the carry trader earns the carry-trade return
associated with each cohort that borrows until he gets a chance to revise his
position.
We let xt denote the fraction of active carry traders at date t. Note
that the paths of the process (xt)t∈R must be Lipschitz continuous, with a
Lipschitz constant smaller than λ. The aggregate real lending LTn taking
place at an arrival date Tn is then equal to
LTn = xTnL
+ + (1− xTn)L−. (26)
7In recent work, Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2013) use a similar assumption to
generate a high tractability and thus new insights in a standard noisy REE asset-pricing
model.
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The evolution of the economy is fully described by two state variables,
the exogenous state variable wt and the endogenous state variable xt. The
exogenous state variable affects only the expected return on carry trade
Θt while the endogenous one affects both the carry trade return and the
equilibrium variables (LTn , ITn , PTn , STn) of the domestic economy. We are
now equipped to define an equilibrium.
Definition. An equilibrium is characterized by a process xt that is adapted
to the filtration of wt and has Lipschitz-continuous paths such that:
LTn = xTnL
+ + (1− xTn)L−, (27)
ITn+1 = R
(
PTn
PTn−1
)1+Φ
, (28)
PTn =
(
P TTn
)1−γ
F β, (29)
P TTnSTn = 1, (30)
ETn
[
ITn+1PTn
PTn+1
]
=
R
LTn +W
, (31)
dxt
dt
=
{
−λxt if Θt < 0,
λ(1− xt) if Θt > 0.
(32)
Equations (28) to (31) state that the domestic economy is in equilibrium
given the paths of xt. Equation (32) states that carry traders make optimal
individual decisions. They become active at switching dates at which the
expected return on the carry trade is positive (or remain active if this was
their previous positions), and inactive if this is negative.
Notice that relations (28) to (30) are identical to their counterparts in
the perfect foresight case except for the re-labelling of dates. They are in
particular log-linear. Conversely, the Euler equation (31) now features an
expectation over the inverse of inflation given the stochastic environment.
We will assume for the remainder of the paper that W + L− and W + L+
are sufficiently close to 1 that l and l defined in (19) and (20) are sufficiently
close to 0, so that we can approximate
lnEt
[
PTn
PTn+1
]
' −Et
[
ln
PTn+1
PTn
]
. (33)
This implies of course that we restrict the analysis to the impact of
relatively small capital inflows. Up to this log-linearization, we have
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Proposition 2. Suppose that
γ > Φ (1− γ) . (34)
For λ sufficiently small, there exists a unique equilibrium defined by a de-
creasing Lipschitz function f such that
dxt
dt
=
{
−λxt if wt < f(xt),
λ(1− xt) if wt > f(xt).
(35)
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium dynamics described in Proposition 2.
[Figure 1 here]
The frontier f divides the (w, x)-space into two regions. Proposition 2 states
that in the unique equilibrium, any trader decides to be active when the
system is to the right of the frontier f at his switching date, and inactive
when it is on the left of the frontier. Thus, lending positions (and therefore
the exchange rate) will tend to rise in the right-hand region, and tend to fall
in the left-hand region, as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.
The expected return on the carry trade at date t is zero if and only if
wt = f(xt). It is positive if (wt, xt) is on the right of the frontier f in the
(w, x)-space and negative if it is on the left of f .
The dynamics of xt implied by the unique equilibrium are given by:
dxt = λ
(
1{wt>f(xt)} − xt
)
dt, (36)
where 1{.} denotes the indicator function that takes the value 1 when the
condition inside the curly brackets is satisfied. These processes are known
as stochastic bifurcations, and are studied in Bass and Burdzy (1999) and
Burdzy et al. (1998). These mathematics papers establish in particular
that for almost every sample path of wt, there exists a unique Lipschitz
solution xt to the differential equation (36) defining the price dynamics for
f Lipschitz decreasing.
The main features of these dynamics can be seen from Figure 1. Starting
on the frontier, a positive shock on w will pull the system on the right of it.
Unless the path of wt is such that a larger negative shock brings it back on
the frontier immediately, a more likely scenario is that lending grows for a
while so that xt becomes close to 1, in which case
dxt
dt becomes close to 0. If
cumulative negative shocks on w eventually lead the system back to the left
of the frontier, then there are large outflows
dxt
dt
' −λ.
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Condition (34) is the same as the one that generates multiple steady-
states in the perfect-foresight case. It is worthwhile commenting on the ad-
ditional condition that capital move sufficiently slowly (λ sufficiently small).
This condition guarantees that the frontier f is decreasing, and thus that
carry trades are destabilizing. To better grasp its role, notice that if a carry
trader expects other carry traders to become active in the future, then he
expects the exchange rate to appreciate. This implies that on one hand,
the currency will be expensive when he will purchase it to lend. On the
other hand, it will keep appreciating over the duration of the loan, thereby
generating a positive return. The former effect is akin to a congestion ef-
fect. Other traders make the trade more expensive and thus less desirable.
Conversely, the latter effect is destabilizing as future carry trades make be-
coming active more appealing. That λ be sufficiently small ensures that this
latter effect offsets the former congestion effect because aggregate lending
does not converge too quickly to its maximum value. Thus a carry trader
with a current switching date is more likely to have a chance to lend before
the currency becomes too expensive, and its upside potential too small. This
congestion effect is the salient difference between our setup and that studied
by Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner.
Note that even if the frontier is increasing, it is still the case that small
shocks wt can have a large impact on carry-trade activity provided it is
sufficiently steep in the (w, x) plane. We focus on the case of a decreasing
frontier
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 essentially extends to this stochastic environment
the logic leading to the perfect-foresight results in Proposition 1. In a first
step, we solve for the nominal exchange rate and domestic interest rate as
a function of future capital inflows. This will yield an expression of the
expected return on carry trades (25) as a function of these inflows and of
the interest-rate differential wt that is the stochastic counterpart of equation
(18). Second, we use this expression to solve for a Lipschitz process that
satisfies (32). This latter step is the equivalent of the one that consisted in
solving for feasible steady-states given the expected return for carry traders
(18) under perfect foresight.
More precisely, the first step consists in using relations (28) to (31) to
express the nominal exchange rate and interest rate as functions of the
expected future paths of capital inflows Lt. This yields in turn a relatively
simple expression for the expected return on the carry trade Θt as a function
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of these expected capital inflows:
Lemma 3. At first-order, the expected return on the carry trade is
Θ (wt, xt) =
∫ +∞
0
((
χω
ω − ρ− λ − 1
)
e−(λ+ρ)v − χω
ω − ρ− λe
−ωv
)
Et [lt+v] dv
+
wt
λ+ ρ
, (37)
where
lt = ln(Lt +W ) ' xtl + (1− xt) l, (38)
ρ = 1− 1
R
, (39)
ω =
Φ
1 + Φ
, (40)
χ =
γ
(1− γ) Φ . (41)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The factor that discounts future capital inflows in (37):(
χω
ω − ρ− λ − 1
)
e−(λ+ρ)v − χω
ω − ρ− λe
−ωv, (42)
is first negative, then positive as v spans [0,+∞).8 This formalizes the above
comment that future active traders create congestion effect for the current
trader. The earliest inflows have a negative impact on Θ because they make
the domestic currency expensive. The more remote inflows are desirable
as the current trader is more likely to have lent before they push up the
exchange rate. The following lemma establishes conditions under which the
congestion effect is not too important.
Lemma 4. Suppose that χ > 1. There exists λ such that for all λ ≤ λ, the
following is true. Suppose that two processes x1t and x
2
t satisfy
0 < x10 ≤ x20 < 1,
For i = 1, 2, dxit = λ
(
1{wt>f i(xit)} − x
i
t
)
dt,
8Notice that this is so regardless of the sign of ω − λ− ρ.
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where f i is decreasing Lipschitz and f2 ≤ f1. Then
Θ(wt, x
2
0) ≥ Θ(wt, x10). (43)
The inequality is strict if f1 6= f2 and/or x10 6= x20.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Lemma 4 states that if (34) holds and λ is sufficiently small, then future
carry trades make current carry trades more attractive because the rein-
forcing effect overcomes the congestion effect. In the balance of the paper,
we suppose that the conditions in Lemma 4 are satisfied. We now show
that there is in this case a unique Lipschitz process xt that satisfies the
equilibrium conditions.
First, the proof of Lemma 4 also shows that the case in which xt obeys
dxt
dt = −λxt for all u ≥ 0 corresponds to a lower bound on the expected
carry-trade return. When xt obeys such dynamics, there exists a frontier f0
such that
wt = f0(xt) =⇒ Θ(xt, wt) = 0 (44)
The frontier f0 is decreasing from Lemma 4 (with f
1 = f2 = +∞) and is
clearly affine and thus Lipschitz.9 Thus an admissible equilibrium process
must be such that traders who have a chance to switch when the system is
on the right of f0 become active.
Define now f1 such that
wt = f1(xt) =⇒ Θ(xt, wt) = 0 (45)
if for all u ≥ 0,
dxt+u
du
=
{
−λxt+u if wt+u < f0(xt+u),
λ(1− xt+u) if wt+u > f0(xt+u).
(46)
That is, f1 is such that a carry trader is indifferent between being active or
inactive when the system is on f1 at his switching date if he believes that
other traders become active if and only if they are on the right of f0. This
function f1 must be decreasing. Suppose otherwise that two points (w, x)
and (w′, x′) on f1 satisfy
x′ > x,
w′ ≥ w.
9The frontier simply obtains from writing Et [lt+v] = l +
(
l − l)xte−λv in (37).
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Then applying Lemma 4 with f2 = f0, f
1 = f0 + w
′ − w contradicts that
both points generate the same expected carry trade return. We also show
in the appendix that f1 is Lipschitz, with a Lipschitz constant smaller than
that of f0.
By iterating this process, we obtain a limit f∞ of the sequence of fron-
tiers (fn)n≥0 that is decreasing Lipschitz as a limit of decreasing Lipschitz
functions with decreasing Lipschitz constants. The process
dxt
dt
=
{
−λxt if wt < f∞(xt),
λ(1− xt) if wt > f∞(xt).
(47)
is an admissible equilibrium since by construction, if all traders switch to
inactivity to the left of f∞ and to activity to the right, the indifference point
for a trader also lies on f∞. We now show that this is the only equilibrium
process.
Consider a translation to the left of the graph of f∞ in (w, x) so that the
whole of the curve lies in a region where wt is sufficiently small that inactivity
is dominant regardless of the dynamics of xt. Call this translation f
′
0. To
the left of f ′0, inactivity is dominant. Then construct f ′1 as the rightmost
translation of f
′
0 such that a trader must choose inactivity to the left of f
′
1
if he believes that other traders will play according to f
′
0. By iterating this
process, we obtain a sequence of translations to the right of f
′
0. Denote by
f ′∞ the limit of the sequence. Refer to Figure 2.
[Figure 2 here]
The boundary f ′∞ does not necessarily define an equilibrium strategy,
since it was merely constructed as a translation of f
′
0. However, we know
that if all others were to play according to the boundary f ′∞, then there is
at least one point A on f ′∞ where the trader is indifferent. If there were no
such point as A, this would imply that f ′∞ is not the rightmost translation,
as required in the definition.
We claim that f ′∞ and f∞ coincide exactly. The argument is by contra-
diction. Suppose that we have a gap between f ′∞ and f∞. Then, choose
point B on f∞ such that A and B have the same height - i.e. correspond to
the same x. But then, since the shape of the boundaries of f ′∞ and f∞ and
the values of x are identical, the paths starting from A must have the same
distribution as the paths starting from B up to the constant difference in the
initial values of w. This contradicts the hypothesis that a trader is indiffer-
ent between the two actions both at A and at B. If he were indifferent at A,
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he would strictly prefer maximum lending at B, and if he is indifferent at B,
he would strictly prefer minimum lending when in A. But we constructed A
and B so that traders are indifferent in both A and B. Thus, there is only
one way to make everything consistent, namely to conclude that A = B.
Thus, there is no “gap”, and we must have f ′∞ = f∞. 
Proposition 2 shows that adding exogenous shocks wt to the carry return
eliminates the indeterminacy of the perfect-foresight case. More precisely,
equilibrium uniqueness stems from the interplay of these shocks with the
fact that each carry trader, when he receives a switching opportunity, needs
to form beliefs about the decisions of the carry traders that will have an
opportunity to switch between now and his next switching date. Suppose
that (wt, xt) is close to a dominance region in which carry traders would
prefer a course of action for sure, but just outside it. If wt was fixed, it
may be possible to construct an equilibrium for both actions, but when
wt moves around stochastically, it will wander into the dominance region
between now and the next opportunity that the trader gets to switch with
some probability. This gives the trader some reason to hedge his bets and
take one course of action for sure. But then, this shifts out the dominance
region, and a new round of reasoning takes place given the new boundary,
and so on.
Remark 1. We model the interest-rate differential as a Brownian mo-
tion for expositional simplicity. It is easy to see that we could write it as
d(wt), where wt is a standard Brownian motion, and d a Lipschitz increasing
function, possibly bounded as long as there are still dominant actions for wt
sufficiently large or small.
Remark 2. While a strong persistence in target rates is undoubtedly
realistic, extensions of this framework can also accommodate for various
forms of mean-reversion (Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner, 2001, or Frankel
and Burdzy, 2005).
Remark 3. The condition that λ be sufficiently small seems particu-
larly relevant for the carry trades that involved many retail investors, such
as those targeting New Zealand dollar or Icelandic krona. The glacier bonds
denominated in Icelandic krona or the uridashi bonds used by Japanese in-
vestors to invest in New Zealand had a typical maturity of 1 to 5 years, and
were principally purchased by retail investors. More generally, Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2009) claim an average two-year rebalancing frequency
to be plausible in FX markets in general, and assume it in order to quan-
titatively explain the forward discount bias. Also, well-documented price
pressure and illiquidity in currency markets, especially for small currencies,
may force professional FX speculators to build-up or unwind large positions
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more gradually than they would like to.10
The case of small shocks
The limiting case in which the volatility σ of the interest-rate differential
tends to zero yields useful insights. It is possible to characterize the shape
of the frontier f in this case.
In this section we denote the frontier fσ to emphasize its dependence on
σ. Suppose the economy is in the state (fσ(xt) , xt) at date t. That is, it is
on the equilibrium frontier. For some arbitrarily small ε > 0, introduce the
stopping times
T1 = inf
u≥0
{xt+u /∈ (ε, 1− ε)} ,
T0 = sup
0≤u<T1
{wt+u 6= fσ (xt+u)} .
In words, T1 is the first date at which xt gets close to 0 or 1, and T0 is
the last date at which xt crosses the frontier before T1. If T0 is small in
distribution, it means that the economy is prone to bifurcations. That
is, it never stays around the frontier for long. Upon hitting it, it quickly
heads towards extreme values of x. The next proposition shows that this
is actually the most likely scenario when σ is small. This, in turn, yields a
simple explicit determination of the frontier.
Proposition 5.
1. As σ → 0, T0 converges to 0 in distribution, and the probability that
dxt
dt > 0 (respectively
dxt
dt < 0) over [T0, T1] converges to 1 − xt (xt
respectively).
2. As σ → 0, the frontier fσ tends to an affine function. For λ sufficiently
small, the slope of this function is increasing in Φ and decreasing in
γ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
First, Proposition 5 clears the concern that in equilibrium, x would only
exhibit small fluctuations around a fixed value because Brownian paths cross
the frontier too often. As σ becomes smaller, the system exhibits more fre-
quent bifurcations towards extremal values of x. When the system reaches
the frontier, it is all the more likely to bifurcate towards capital outflows
10In fact, our model is identical to one in which a single large carry trader can move his
capital only at the rate λ.
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when cumulative inflows have been large (x large). Thus the model does gen-
erate “destabilizing carry trades,” whereby carry traders generate durable
self-justified excess returns on the carry trade followed by large reversals.
The second point in Proposition 5 relates the slope of the frontier fσ to
the monetary parameters of the model Φ and γ in this case of small shocks.
The slope of the frontier affects the dynamics of capital inflows and in turn
the exchange-rate dynamics. If the graph of the frontier is closer to being
horizontal in the (w, x) plane, then the system should cross the frontier less
often, and thus do so only for more extreme values of x. Carry-trade returns
should in this case exhibit more serial correlation and fatter tails. Point 2
states that, at least for λ sufficiently small, the frontier is flatter when Φ is
smaller, and γ larger. In other words, if the central bank fails to respond
to inflows by sufficiently reducing its official rate, then carry trade returns
should exhibit more skewness.
4 Empirical content
The model generates a rich set of qualitative empirical predictions. This
suggests that a coordination motive among carry traders may be a com-
mon force behind several well-documented empirical findings on carry-trade
returns.
Profitability of FX momentum strategies
Proposition 5 shows that as σ → 0, the system often bifurcates in one
direction. This implies that, at least at a sufficiently short horizon, returns
are positively autocorrelated, so that momentum strategies in FX markets
should generate a positive excess return.
It is important to stress that the profitability of momentum strategies
is not a mechanical consequence of the assumption of slow-moving capital
(λ sufficiently small). Returns on the carry trade are still positively auto-
correlated if the system bifurcates quickly towards extreme values of activity
x. The key economic force behind this profitability of momentum strategies
is that once carry traders coordinate on a course of action, they stick to it
until a sufficiently large reversal of the interest-rate differential leads them to
switch to a different strategy. Such a rationalization of momentum returns
with coordination motives is novel to our knowledge.
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Profitability of FX carry trades
Lemma 4 implies that the equilibrium expected return on the carry trade
Θ(w, x) increases with respect to x. It also implies that Θ(w, x) increases
with respect to w, because an increase in w is equivalent to a leftward
translation of the frontier f in the graph (w, x). On the other hand, the
interest-rate differential increases in w and decreases in x. We have indeed:
Lemma 6. At first-order, the interest-rate differential at a given arrival
date Tn is given by
R
(
wTn − lTn −
1
1 + Φ
∫ +∞
0
e−ωsETn [lTn+s] ds
)
. (48)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The interest-rate differential increases w.r.t. w but decreases w.r.t. l
(and thus x) because the current domestic real rate is lower and future
deflation more likely when l is large. Thus the expected return on the carry
trade is not unambiguously increasing in the interest-rate differential. For
l, l sufficiently small, however, most of the interest-rate differential is due to
the exogenous component w rather than to the endogenous actions of the
carry traders l. In this case, when the interest-rate differential is sufficiently
large in absolute terms, it must be that the system is on the right (left) of
the frontier when the differential is positive (negative). In other words, we
have the following interesting prediction:
A positive (negative) interest-rate differential predicts a positive (neg-
ative) return on the carry-trade only for sufficiently large absolute differ-
entials. The exchange rate must be more volatile when the interest-rate
differential is small.
When w is small, so is the interest-rate differential, and the differential
may correspond to values of (w, x) that are either on the left or on the right
of the frontier. The expected return on the carry trade is thus unclear.
Since the system is closer to the frontier in this case, future crossings of the
frontier are more likely and thus the exchange rate should be more volatile.
This is because close to the frontier, for a finite σ, it takes more time to
carry traders to coordinate on a given course of action and bifurcate in
one direction. This nonlinear impact of the interest-rate differential on the
carry-trade return has not been tested to our knowledge.
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Peso problem
A large literature argues that the return on the carry trade partly reflects a
risk premium for rare and extreme events that may not show in finite samples
(see, e.g., Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo, 2011, Farhi and
Gabaix, 2014, Jurek, 2014, or Lewis, 2007, and the references herein.) We
closely connect to this literature as follows. Fix  > 0 small. The expected
return on the carry trade is 0 starting both from (f(), ) and (f(1−), 1−)
in the (w, x) plane. Yet from Proposition 5, as σ becomes small, most
paths starting from (f(), ) will exhibit long periods of appreciation of the
domestic currency ended with rare (and large) depreciations, while paths
starting from (f(1−), 1−) will feature a symmetric prolonged depreciation.
The interest-rate differential is positive in the former case and negative in
the latter. Thus, finite samples should yield that a positive interest-rate
differential predicts a positive excess return on the carry trade even when
the unconditional return is zero.
Leverage and currency appreciation predict financial crises
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) find that credit expansion and appreciation
of the domestic currency predict financial crises. The build up of leverage
and currency appreciation correspond to paths in which x increases for a long
time in our model. Such paths are the ones in which sharp deleveraging and
important capital outflows are most likely to occur soon other things being
equal.
Monetary policy and carry-trade returns
In addition to relating to the above existing empirical findings, the model
also generates a new range of predictions on the relationship between the
stance of monetary policy and the distribution of the returns on momentum
and carry trade strategies. Proposition 5 suggests that the frontier is flatter
when Φ is smaller and γ larger. In words, the frontier is flatter when the
central bank is more reluctant to respond to a surge in carry-trade activity
with a large reduction in the official rate. This is in turn more likely to be
the case when the prices of nontradables are very sticky. Otherwise stated,
if an economy is such that the CPI is not too sensitive to the exchange
rate, and/or the central bank not too aggressive, then this economy should
be more prone to large fluctuations in carry-trade activity because it will
experience more prolonged bifurcations. Thus the returns on carry-trade
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and momentum strategies should have fatter tails. These predictions are
novel, to our knowledge.
Concluding remarks
As a conclusion, we briefly discuss two interesting avenues for future re-
search.
• More general preferences. Assuming that households are risk neutral
over late consumption dramatically simplifies the analysis, because it
implies that the impact of capital inflows on the real rate is straight-
forward. With strictly concave preferences, the current real rate would
depend on consumption growth, so that we could no longer abstract
from the impact of foreign lending on quantities and thus production
in the domestic economy as we are able to do here. We find it useful
to derive our novel mechanism for self-fulfilling profitable carry trades
in a highly tractable framework that delivers clear intuitions. An in-
teresting avenue for future research is the study of the impact of such
carry trades on quantities under more standard preferences. For such
a study, one should also introduce a more standard modelling of price
adjustment.
• Repelling carry traders. We assume here that the domestic central
bank does not use an appropriate rule. An interesting avenue for fu-
ture research consists in explicitly modelling the commitment issues or
welfare costs that prevent the monetary authority from using a larger
Φ. This would pave the way to a normative analysis. Notice that the
central bank can repell carry traders in this framework in three other
ways: using a measure of inflation that is tilted towards tradables,
adding a term that is sufficiently decreasing in the exchange rate ap-
preciation to the interest-rate rule, or simply targeting the realized
real rate r − lt. It is easy to see from the perfect-foresight model that
these three measures are strictly equivalent in this simple environ-
ment, because they all amount to sufficiently reducing the official rate
in response to carry-trade activity, therereby discouraging it. These
different policies would probably each come with distinctive costs in
a more general environment. In any case, a clear implication from
this framework is that a decrease in the official rate is the appropriate
response when foreign speculative inflows bid up domestic asset prices.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
Using the first-order approximation (33) in (31), relations (28) and (31)
yield domestic inflation as a function of future expected inflows as in the
perfect-foresight case:
ln
PTn
PTn−1
= −
∑
k≥0
ETn
[
lTn+k
]
(1 + Φ)k+1
, (49)
where lt = ln(Lt +W ). As in the perfect-foresight case, (29) and (30) yield
in turn:
ETn
[
ln
STn+1ITn+1
RSTn
]
=
γ
1− γ
∑
k≥0
ETn
[
lTn+k+1
]
(1 + Φ)k+1
− lTn (50)
One can write (25) as
Θt = Et
∑
m≥0
1{Tλ>Tn+m}
Rm
ETn+m
[
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
RSTn+m
− 1 + wTn+m
)] .
(51)
At first-order w.r.t. lt,
ETn+m
[
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
RSTn+m
− 1
)]
= ETn+m
[
ln
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
RSTn+m
]
(52)
=
γ
1− γ
∑
k≥0
ETn+m
[
lTn+m+k+1
]
(1 + Φ)k+1
− lTn+m . (53)
Thus,
Θt = Et
∫ +∞
0
∑
m≥1
( s
R
)m−1 e−(λ+1)s
(m− 1)!
[∫ +∞
0
γ
1−γ
∑
k≥1
uk−1
(k−1)!
e−u
(1+Φ)k
lt+s+udu
−lt+s + wt
]
ds
 ,
(54)
= Et
[∫ +∞
0
e−(λ+ρ)s
(∫ +∞
0
χωe−ωult+s+udu− lt+s + wt
)
ds
]
, (55)
=
∫ +∞
0
e−(λ+ρ)v
(
χω
∫ v
0
e−(ω−λ−ρ)udu− 1
)
Et [lt+v] dv +
wt
λ+ ρ
, (56)
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and integrating yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose χ > 1. Consider two processes x1t and x
2
t that satisfy the conditions
stated in Lemma 4 with x10 < x
2
0. Lemma 2 in Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner
(1998) states that almost surely,
x2t ≥ x1t for all t ≥ 0. (57)
This implies in particular that whenever traders switch to being active along
a sample path of (wt, x
1
t ), so do they along the sample path of (wt, x
2
t ) that
corresponds to the same sample path of wt. This is because it must be that
(wt, x
2
t ) is on the right of the frontier f
2 whenever (wt, x
1
t ) is on the right of
the frontier f1. Thus, the process
yt = x
2
t − x1t (58)
satisfies
0 < y0 < 1, (59)
dyt
dt
= λ(t − yt), (60)
where t ∈ {0; 1}.
In order to prove the Lemma, we only need to find λ such that for all λ ≤ λ,
∆ =
∫ +∞
0
((
χω
ω − ρ− λ − 1
)
e−(λ+ρ)v − χω
ω − ρ− λe
−ωv
)
yvdv ≥ 0. (61)
for all deterministic process yt that obeys (59) and (60). The result then
obtains from taking expectations over all paths of wt.
To prove (61), we introduce the function ζ that satisfies{dζ(v)
dv = −
((
χω
ω−ρ−λ − 1
)
e−(λ+ρ)v − χωω−ρ−λe−ωv
)
,
lim+∞ ζ = 0.
Integrating by parts, we have
∆ = ζ(0)y0 +
∫ +∞
0
ζ(v)
dyv
dv
dv, (62)
= ζ(0)y0 + λ
∫ +∞
0
ζ(v)(v − yv)dv. (63)
30
Further,
yv = y0e
−λv + λ
∫ v
0
e−λ(v−u)udu, (64)
and thus,
∆ = y0
(
ζ(0)− λ
∫ +∞
0
ζ(v)e−λvdv
)
(65)
+ λ
[∫ +∞
0
v
(
ζ(v)− λ
∫ +∞
v
ζ(u)e−λ(u−v)du
)]
. (66)
We have
lim
λ→0
ζ(0) =
χ− 1
ρ
> 0, (67)
ζ is increasing then decreasing beyond a value that stays bounded as λ tends
to zero, and
∫ +∞
0 ζ converges. Thus for λ sufficiently small,
ζ(v)− λ
∫ +∞
v
ζ(u)e−λ(u−v)du (68)
is positive for all v ≥ 0, which yields that ∆ is positive, and concludes the
proof.
Complement to the proof of Proposition 2
We prove here that f1 is Lipschitz with a constant that is smaller than that
of f0, that we denote K0. Suppose by contradiction that two points (wt, xt)
and (w′t, x′t) on f1 satisfy
x′ > x, (69)
x′t − xt
wt − w′t
<
1
K0
. (70)
We compare the paths x′t+u and xt+u corresponding to pairs of paths of w′t+u
and wt+u that satisfy for all u ≥ 0
wt+u − w′t+u = wt − w′t. (71)
It must be that for such pairs of paths:
x′t+u − xt+u ≤ (x′t − xt)e−λu. (72)
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Otherwise it would have to be the case that (w′, x′) can be on the right of
f0 when (w, x) is not. Let T denote the first time at which this occurs. It
must be that
K0e
−λT (x′t − xt) ≥ wt+T − w′t+T = wt − w′t, (73)
a contradiction with (70).
Thus along such paths of w′t+u − wt+u, x′t+u − xt+u shrinks at least as
fast as when traders switch to inactivity all the time. Together with (70),
this implies that the expected return on the carry trade cannot be the same
in (wt, xt) and (w
′
t, x
′
t), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5
The first point is a particular case of Theorem 2 in Burdzy, Frankel, and
Pauzner (1998). To prove the second point, notice that as σ → 0, starting
from a point on the frontier,
Et [xt+v] ' (1− xt)
(
1− (1− xt)e−λv
)
+ x2t e
−λv (74)
because the system bifurcates upwards with probability 1 − xt and down-
wards with probability xt in the limit. Plugging this in (37) and writing
that the expected return is zero yields a slope of the frontier equal to
− (l − l)(λ+ ρ)
( χωω−λ−ρ − 1)( 22λ+ρ − 1λ+ρ)
− χωω−λ−ρ
(
2
ω+λ − 1ω
)  , (75)
which tends to
− (l − l)(χ− 1) (76)
as λ → 0. This means that the absolute value of the slope of the frontier
varies as χ w.r.t. γ, Φ for σ, λ sufficiently small.
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Proof of Lemma 6
We have
ITn+1 −R(1− wTn) = R
((
PTn
PTn−1
)1+Φ
− 1 + wTn
)
, (77)
' R
wTn − ETn
∑
k≥0
lTn+k
(1 + Φ)k
 , (78)
= R
wTn − lTn − ∫ +∞
0
∑
k≥1
sk−1e−s
(k − 1)!(1 + Φ)kETn [lTn+s] ds
 ,
(79)
= R
(
wTn − lTn −
1
1 + Φ
∫ +∞
0
e−ωsETn [lTn+s] ds
)
.
(80)
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